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ABSTRACT
One of the first actions of the Environmental Protection Agency after
the declaration of the COVID-19 crisis in mid-March 2020 was to announce
that it would relax its enforcement policies with respect to environmental
reporting and violations during the time of the pandemic. Ostensibly this
was to ensure that regulated entities were not penalized by their inability
to have inspectors on the front lines to ensure that substantive permit and
monitoring requirements were followed. Taking their lead from the EPA,
many states announced that they were following suit.
EPA always has discretion in terms of enforcement, but in making a blanket
announcement, the agency created the space for substantial pollution and
health risk from lack of adequate compliance in the regulated communities. It
is hard to know what harms exist when reporting requirements are waived.
This also sent the message that environmental protection is not a “critical
function” which it should be at all times.
After climate induced disasters, federal and state agencies have done the
same thing, abusing the “emergency” exemption privileges to give a broad
non-compliance pass to regulated industries.
The uproar of the enforcement pause during the COVID-19 epidemic
has shown a light on the abuse of enforcement discretion in disasters which
are becoming more frequent with climate change.
This Article examines the legal basis of emergency exemptions, provides
examples of how they have been abused in climate related disasters and
the COVID -19 epidemic, and proposes solutions to curtail the abuse of these
exemptions while still accounting for genuine emergency conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thousands of oil and gas operations, government facilities and other sites won
permission to stop monitoring for hazardous emissions or otherwise bypass rules
intended to protect health and the environment because of the coronavirus
outbreak, The Associated Press has found.
The result: approval for less environmental monitoring at some Texas refineries
and at an army depot dismantling warheads armed with nerve gas in Kentucky,
manure piling up and the mass disposal of livestock carcasses at farms in Iowa and
Minnesota, and other risks to communities as governments eased enforcement over
smokestacks, medical waste shipments, sewage plants, oilfields and chemical
plants.
The Trump administration paved the way for the reduced monitoring on
March 26 after being pressured by the oil and gas industry, which said lockdowns
and social distancing during the pandemic made it difficult to comply with
anti-pollution rules. States are responsible for much of the oversight of
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federal environmental laws, and many followed with leniency policies of their
own.1

COVID-19 can rightfully take its place among terrible disasters that have
affected the United States. Like climate change, COVID-19 exacerbated
pre-existing health conditions, increasing death and impacting the public
health.2 And like climate change linked disasters, COVID-19 resulted in
“emergency” health and safety enforcement waivers, from the EPA, and with
EPA’s tacit encouragement, from the states. As with many emergency waivers,
it isn’t clear if this emergency waiver was necessary, and we will never
fully know what harm resulted from this waiver.
Worse yet, as we have seen with the waivers from COVID, emergency
waivers and enforcement problems can build off of each other, creating
synergistic harms to public health. Researchers found that with the EPA’s
enforcement relaxation due to COVID, that harmful air pollutants (such
as particulates and ozone) rose in heavily industrialized areas.3 These
areas in turn saw a spike in daily death rates from COVID that bore a positive
statistical relationship to the rise in pollutants related to the waiver.4 The
enforcement waiver, entered ostensibly to protect workers from the novel
coronavirus, likely caused a larger increase in public health impacts.
Congressional investigators are linking this to particularly hard impacts
on minority communities, creating environmental justice concerns.5
Emergency waivers from health and safety laws are too easy to get and
are abused. As climate induced disasters increase emergency situations,
their use, and thus abuse, may become more and more common. Public
health impacts in turn may be even worse than can be predicted as public
health menaces related to climate change interact synergistically. As the
attention on the COVID environmental enforcement waivers make clear,
1. Ellen Knickmeyer et al., Thousands Allowed to Bypass Environmental Rules
During Pandemic, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/3bf753f9036e7
d88f4746b1a36c1ddc4 [https://perma.cc/D6DM-U3YU].
2. Sean Reilly, Air Pollution linked to 9% Higher Virus Death Rate, GREENWIRE
(Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2020/09/11/stories/1063713515 [https://
perma.cc/5XL2-YBTK.
3. Sean Reilly, Study of Emissions and Virus Deaths Implicates EPA Policy,
GREENWIRE (Jul. 17, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2020/07/17/stories/10635
80943 [https://perma.cc/XA23-SGDZ].
4. Id.
5. Kelsey Brugger, Feud with Democrats escalates over enforcement plans,
GREENWIRE (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2020/04/23/stories/10629
52295 [https://perma.cc/6VE8-6RDC].
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we need to rethink these emergency waivers and disasters, or we will wind
up with more harm towards more vulnerable people for the benefit of
shareholders.
II. EMERGENCY WAIVER ABUSES AND HARM – LESSONS
FROM THE LAST THREE YEARS
A. Hurricane Harvey
On August 23, 2017, Texas Governor Greg Abbott declared a state of
disaster as Hurricane Harvey approached the Texas Gulf Coast.6 In
September 2017, the state of disaster was ultimately expanded to sixty
Texas counties. Governor Perry was continuing to renew this declaration
as of October 7, 2020 – over three years after Hurricane Harvey hit.7
Emergency disaster declarations in Texas (as in many states and for the
federal government) allow the governor to unilaterally suspend specific
rules and regulations if they would hinder disaster recovery.8 Pursuant to
the Harvey emergency, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(TCEQ) formally requested Governor Abbott to suspend dozens of
environmental rules on August 28, 2017, as Hurricane Harvey was breaking
rain records in Houston and the Texas Gulf Coast area.9
The waiver requested suspension of air quality rules during the emergency
related to emission “upset” events as well as suspension of the monitoring
and release of unpermitted Volatile Organic Compounds.10 As required
for a request for emergency waivers, the request indicated why it was necessary
given immediate Hurricane Harvey and hurricane recovery efforts. Specifically,
the TCEQ’s request noted that environmental law compliance on air and
water pollution:

6. Governor of Texas, Proclamation Declaring State of Disaster Under Section
418.014 of the Tex. Government Code (Aug. 23, 2017), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/
Governor_Abbott_Declares_State_of_Disaster_For_30_Texas_Counties.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S5KM-KHND.
7. Governor Greg Abbott Renews the State Disaster Declaration for Counties
Impacted by Hurricane Harvey, OFFICE OF THE TEXAS GOVERNOR, Oct. 7, 2020, https://
gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-greg-abbott-renews-the-state-disaster-declaration-forcounties-impacted-by-hurricane-harvey [https://perma.cc/W4ST-MGPY].
8. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 418.012; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 418.014; TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 418.016 (LexisNexis 2019).
9. Request for Suspension of TCEQ Rules (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.tceq.texas.gov/
assets/public/response/hurricanes/suspension-of-tceq-rules-8.28.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZJP7-LLKP.
10. Id.
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. . .may not be possible as a result of hurricane effects, such as lightning, floods,
fires, wind or wind-blown damage, and power outages [;] and suspending these
requirements would remove a potential impediment to disaster response.11

However, these waivers stayed in place long after direct effects of
Hurricane Harvey (lightning, floods, fires, wind, or wind-blown damage)
had passed, and electricity had been restored. Most of the Gulf Coast
region, including Harris County had dried out within 4 weeks and electricity
was mostly restored within days.12
Despite this, Governor Abbott did not end the emergency waiver of
these air and water pollution environmental rules until April 6, 2018, over
8 months after Hurricane Harvey hit. During this time, investigators from
news organizations and NGOs discovered over 100 toxic pollution releases.13
According to the Houston Chronicle:
In all, reporters cataloged more than 100 Harvey-related toxic releases — on land,
in water and air. Most were never publicized.14

While some of these incidents happened during Hurricane Harvey itself,
many others may have happened afterwards.
The public will probably never know the extent of what happened to the environment
after Harvey,” said Rock Owens, supervising environmental attorney for Harris
County. “But the individual companies of course know.15

When a disaster such as an unprecedented flooding happen in Houston,
one of the nation’s largest industrial hubs, the results can be particularly
bad. According to Time:

11.
12.

Id. at 1.
Ryan Maye Handy, Power outages reported in wake of Hurricane Harvey,
HOUSTON CHRON. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-weather/hurricane
harvey/article/Houston-still-has-power-power-loss-for-hundreds-11968986.php [https://perma.
cc/V597-8DAQ.
13. Alex Stuckey, Hurricane Harvey-caused water and air pollution likely far
higher than residents realize, HOUSTON CHRON. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.chron.com/
news/science-environment/article/Harvey-pollution-13152511.php [https://perma.cc/
YG4D-7PPK.
14. Frank Bajak, Silent Spills, Part 1: In Houston and beyond, Harvey’s spills leave a
toxic legacy, HOUSTON CHRON., https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/
houston/article/In-Houston-and-beyond-Harvey-s-spills-leave-a-12771237.php [https://perma.cc/
AEA4-HNXA].
15. Id.
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Any mass flooding event brings with it public health concerns about the spread
of contaminants through the water, but Houston’s industrial sector—heavy on oil,
gas and chemicals—has experts particularly worried that extreme flooding has
created conditions that could lead to environmental disaster.16

In addition to the suspension of environmental and health and safety
requirements, reporting requirements were also suspended.17 Thus, the
waiver of environmental, health and safety rules not only impacts public
health, but keeps us from getting information to know the extent of the
harm.
B. The COVID Pandemic Strikes
On March 18, 2020, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
announced a policy offering regulated entities swift relief from enforcement
policies based on unexamined claims that COVID made compliance with
regulation and monitoring difficult or impossible.18 Shortly after, at the
federal level, the EPA’s Chief of Enforcement, Susan Bodine, issued a
regulatory relief program with more cooperative enforcement and waivers
of penalties ostensibly because of problems with monitoring and regulating
during COVID. These waivers included routine compliance monitoring,
integrity testing, sampling, laboratory analysis, training, and reporting or
certification.19 The waiver was repealed effective August 31, 2020,20 even
though the COVID positivity rate, COVID cases, and COVID deaths were
much higher at this time than at the initiation of the waiver.21
Other states followed the EPA’s lead. According to an Associated Press
article examining these waivers, many states issued blanket waivers from
enforcement and monitoring while almost all states fielded such requests.22
Again, ostensibly these were to protect people during COVID exposure risk.
In its request to take advantage of the COVID waiver in Indiana, Marathon’s

16. Justin Worland, Hurricane Harvey’s Environmental Toll Will Only Get Worse,
TIME MAG. (AUG. 31 2017), http://time.com/4923245/hurricane-harvey-arkema-groupexplosion/ [https://perma.cc/NB3X-3Q5M].
17. Stuckey, supra note 13.
18. Sean Reilly, Texas Environment Chief Defends Plan Offering Polluters Help,
E&E NEWS, (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2020/04/06/stories/1062
805101 [https://perma.cc/X2L8-S9TM].
19. Susan Parker Bodine, COVID-19 Implications for EPA’s Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance Program, U.S. EPA, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460, https://www.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2020-03/documents/oecamemooncovid19implications.pdf
[https://perma.cc/537Q-TV8J].
20. Id.
21. The COVID Tracking Project, US Daily Deaths, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY GROUP,
https://covidtracking.com/data/charts/us-daily-deaths [https://perma.cc/CBL8-C6EG].
22.
Knickmeyer et al., supra note 1.
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auditing and process manager wrote, “We believe that by taking these
measures, we can do our part to slow the spread of the COVID-19 virus.”23
In Texas, by September 4, 2020, there had been over 200 requests for
waivers- most from large petrochemical facilities.24 Importantly, many of
these requests were to suspend leak inspection detection and repair (LDAR).
LDAR is the only way to monitor whether or not there are leaks of hazardous
air pollutants, which can expand if not corrected. As previously quoted
in the Associated Press article, this author stated:
“The whole point of leak detection is to avoid people being harmed from a leak
of toxic material,” said Victor Flatt, environmental law professor at the University
of Houston. “If you suspend leak detection, you don’t even know if it’s happening.”25

III. THE LAW GOVERNING EMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT WAIVERS
During a disaster, government may need to take immediate actions to
preserve life and public health as well as property. In such cases, government
strives to have a system in place to alleviate legal liability when actions
are designed to deal with a greater harm. Federal law contains multiple
individual emergency provisions in statutes, and the Stafford Act generally
allows the federal government to declare states of emergency.26 The Stafford
Act grants many powers to the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
including providing an exemption from National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) for immediate response actions.27 In addition to the Stafford
Act, the National Emergencies Act and the Public Health Service Act can
also provide broad authority to waive or alter laws.28
Individual federal environmental laws also contain waiver authority.
For example, section 110(f) of the Clean Air Act allows the President to
declare a national or regional emergency, which authorizes governors to
suspend their state implementation plans for achieving air quality standards
for up to four months.29 The Clean Water Act also contains several emergency

23. Id.
24. TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, https://www.tceq.texas.gov/
response/covid-19/pending-permit-applications-during-covid-19-disaster [https://perma.cc/
Q4EK-MJYQ].
25. Knickmeyer et al, supra note 1.
26. Stafford Act, § 501(b), 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (2021).
27. § 5159; § 7410 (f)(1)-(4); 44 C.F.R. § 10.8 (2016).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2021); 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2021).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (f)(1)-(4)(West).
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exemptions, including waivers for “acts of God [or] an act of war,”30
emergencies requiring expedited permit-processing by the Corp of Engineers,31
and allowances for exigent discharges of oil and other hazardous
substances.32 Though these provisions make it evident that Congress intended
to provide some flexibility to states as they adapt to pending emergencies,
the provisions make it equally clear that there are reasonable limitations
on this flexibility.
However, given the “cooperative federalism” model for environmental
laws, state laws governing emergencies and emergency waivers have even
more impact on environmental protection. Most state disaster waiver laws
use language that seem to limit disaster waivers during times of emergency
or crisis.33 However, depending on the state’s definition of emergency,
disaster waiver process, and the EPA’s accommodation of the state’s
disaster waiver, locations can technically still be in emergency situations
even if those situations arguably no longer hinder the enforcement of
environmental and health and safety laws.
The laws seem clear. For example, in Texas, under the Texas Disaster
Act of 1975, the governor may “suspend the provisions of any regulatory
statute” prescribing state or agency procedure if “strict compliance” with
its provisions, orders or rules would “in any way prevent, hinder, or delay
necessary action in coping with the disaster.”34 Though written broadly,
here the statutory language suggests that the executive’s discretion is not
completely unrestrained. It is true that the governor may suspend the provisions
of any state or agency statute during an emergency, but it appears the governor
may only do so if strict compliance with its provisions would “prevent,
hinder, or delay” necessary action.35
Thus, theoretically, the governor of Texas should not be able to suspend
an environmental provision unless strict compliance with the provision
would result in some impairment of “necessary” action related to the
emergency or disaster. However, what constitutes “necessary” emergency
action at the local level amidst disaster has not been articulated. This lack
of clarity leaves defining an emergency or disaster regarding environmental
waivers to the discretion of the executive branch.
The state of California employs similar statutory language under the
California Emergency Services Act (CEAS), which states:

30. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2021).
31. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(e)(4) (2021).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(2) (2021); 40 C.F.R § 122.3(d) (2013).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 252.36(2) (2019); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.014(c) (2013);
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8624 (2011).
34. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.016(a) (2013).
35. Id.
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During a state of war emergency or a state of emergency the Governor may
suspend any regulatory statute, or statute prescribing the procedure for conduct
of state business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency. . .
where the Governor determines and declares that strict compliance with any
statute, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay the
mitigation of the effects of the emergency.36

The state of Florida’s emergency waiver law is strikingly similar and
provides that the governor may:
Suspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for
conduct of state business or the orders or rules of any state agency, if strict
compliance with the provisions of any such statute, order, or rule would in any
way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency.37

In most of these largely populated states, notwithstanding their discretion
ostensibly being limited by certain conditions, compliance with the time
limitations is also a concern. In Florida, the emergency power of the governor
is constrained by a time limit, as section 252.36(2) states:
The state of emergency shall continue until the Governor finds that the threat
or danger has been dealt with to the extent that the emergency conditions no
longer exist and she or he terminates the state of emergency by executive order
or proclamation, but no state of emergency may continue for longer than 60 days
unless renewed by the Governor. The Legislature by concurrent resolution may
terminate a state of emergency at any time.38

Texas has a time limitation on disaster declarations, requiring that disaster
declarations go no more than thirty days unless renewed by the governor.39
However, the governor’s determinations can be vetoed by the legislature.40
California also establishes a time limit of thirty days for state of war emergency
powers, after which the emergency ends absent a special legislative session.41
In non-war emergencies, the governor must proclaim the emergency ended
at the “earliest possible date that conditions warrant” or when a concurrent
resolution of the California legislature declares its termination.42 Importantly,
this language suggests that California’s emergency statutes appear written
to invite legislative approval for any continuations of states of emergency.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8571 (1990).
FLA. STAT. § 252.36(5)(a) (2019); see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 724(d)(1) (2020).
FLA. STAT. § 252.36(2) (2019).
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.014(c) (2013).
§ 418.013(c).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8624 (2011).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8629 (1970).
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The problem is that these time limits in some cases are easily bypassed
by extension, meaning that disaster declarations and emergency waivers
have continued long after the emergency conditions that would make
compliance difficult have ceased. For instance, in Texas, environmental
waivers for Hurricane Harvey only ended after eight months, and as late
as October 7, 2020, Governor Abbot renewed the Harvey Disaster....43
The federal declaration of the COVID enforcement waivers demonstrates
a similar pattern. The “waiver” was ostensibly designed to accommodate
the need to social distance during the pandemic, but the waiver was lifted
on August 31, 202044 when COVID infections were peaking across the
country.45 If in fact, the waiver was needed to accommodate emergency
conditions, the rationale was undercut by its lifting, indicating the action
was arbitrary and capricious in at least one of the determinations.
The definitions of states of “emergency” or “disaster” in local statutes
are also so broad that they do not provide adequate limitations of executive
power. For instance, in California, a state of “emergency” is defined as
“the duly proclaimed existence of conditions of disaster . . . or of extreme
peril to persons and property . . . caused by conditions such as . . . air pollution,
fire, flood, storm, epidemic, riot drought, cyberterrorism . . . likely to be
beyond the control of the . . . facilities of any single county. . . .”46
This definition, though lengthy, does little in terms of limiting what may
rise to the level of an emergency. In Florida,, a disaster is defined as “any
natural, technological, or civil emergency that causes damage of sufficient
severity and magnitude to result in a declaration of a state of emergency”,47
and an emergency is defined as “any occurrence, or threat thereof . . .
which results or may result in substantial injury or harm to the population
or substantial damage to. . . property.”48 In Texas, disasters are defined as
“occurrence[s] or imminent threat[s] of widespread or severe damage, injury,
or loss of life or property . . . resulting from any natural or man-made
cause.”49

43. Governor Greg Abbott Renews the State Disaster Declaration for Counties
Impacted by Hurricane Harvey, OFFICE OF THE TEXAS GOVERNOR, Oct. 7, 2020, https://gov.
texas.gov/news/post/governor-greg-abbott-renews-the-state-disaster-declaration-forcounties-impacted-by-hurricane-harvey [https://perma.cc/W4ST-MGPY].
44. Susan Parker Bodine, COVID-19 Implications for EPA’s Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance Program, Addendum on Termination, U.S. EPA, WASHINGTON,
D.C. 20460, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-06/documents/covid19addendum
ontermination.pdf [https://perma.cc/27HL-NW4L].
45. See COVID Tracking Project, supra note 21.
46. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8558(b) (2018) (emphasis added).
47. FLA. STAT. § 252.34(2) (2019).
48. FLA. STAT. § 252.34(4) (2019).
49. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.004(1) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.).
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There have been recent cases seeking to curtail emergency declarations
under the COVID epidemic, but these cases may not be equally applicable
to waivers of enforcement and reporting requirements.50
The Michigan Supreme Court recently ruled that Governor Whitmer lacks
the authority to declare an extended state of emergency or disaster under
the Emergency Management Act of 1976 (EMA) or the Emergency Powers
of the Governor Act from 1945 (EPGA).51 The Court addressed these two
Acts separately as they pertain to the legitimacy of Governor Whitmer’s
attempted extension of the COVID state of emergency beyond the date of
April 30, 2020, authorized by the legislature.
First, the Court held that the Governor’s attempted extension of the
emergency beyond twenty-eight days without legislative approval was
beyond the authority of EMA, as EMA requires that the “governor shall
issue an executive order declaring the emergency terminated, unless a
request by the governor for an extension of the state of [disaster/emergency]
for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of
the legislature.”52 The Court next analyzed the EPGA, which more broadly
authorizes the governor to promulgate “orders, rules, and regulations” which
help to “bring the emergency situation . . . under control,” requiring only
that such rules are “reasonable” and “necessary.”53 Although the Court conceded
that the EPGA authorized the Governor to extend emergencies indefinitely,
it held that the EPGA violated the Michigan Constitution because it
“purport[ed] to delegate to the executive branch the legislative power of
state government—including its plenary police powers.”54
Michigan’s highest court was not alone in their view that extensions of
COVID emergency restrictions require legislative authorization and
cannot be unilaterally exercised with impunity by local officials, be they
governors or administrators. In Wisconsin, Secretary Palm of the Department
of Health Services (DHS) issued an order requiring all persons to remain
home, prohibiting all travel, and requiring non-essential businesses to close.55
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Emergency Order amounted

50. See e.g., Wisconsin Legis. v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Wis. 2020); In re
Certified Questions from U.S. Dist. Ct., W. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., 161492, 2020 WL
5877599 (Mich. Oct. 2, 2020).
51. In re Certified Questions, 2020 WL 5877599, at *24.
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id. at 16 (quoting the statutory language from MCL 10.31(1)).
54. In re Certified Questions, 2020 WL 5877599, at *24.
55. Wisconsin Legis. v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Wis. 2020).

11

to a “rule” and was promulgated without following the emergency rulemaking
procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act.56
These cases articulate important points regarding local officials’ extensions
of emergencies. First, although emergency statutes may be broad in their
authorization of executive power, this power is frequently limited in time
and scope by the same statute. Second, even when statutory authority seems
to authorize a local official’s “indefinite” expansion of a given emergency,
the statute may be unconstitutional if it infringes on the legislative’s traditional
plenary powers.
While this developing case law might address the open-ended emergency
declaration issue, it is telling that it prohibits government action in response
to the emergency as opposed to government waivers of inaction. Similarly,
in both the states of Michigan and Wisconsin, where recent rulings curtailed
the governors’ powers to declare emergencies, there is divided government.
In both states, the governorship is in Democratic hands while the legislature
is in Republican hands. Although this does not mean that governor power
will not be challenged (i.e., see Republican challenges to Texas Governor
Abbot’s COVID proclamations), disputes over emergency powers seem
more likely to erupt in politically split states, leaving states with unified
government less protected from unnecessary environmental enforcement
waivers.
Even when implemented for appropriate reasons, waivers can still be
abused by the regulated community, or simply be too broad in scope or in
time. The very nature of being in an “emergency” lessens the thought and
care that goes into waivers. The Obama administration EPA exercised
enforcement discretion after Superstorm Sandy, 57 and though these
enforcement waivers were not called out as underhanded attempts to help
industry, multiple complaints emerged about public health impacts and how
care should have been implemented.58
In summary, the current emergency waiver laws are not working properly.
At worst, such waivers can provide a “cover” for lax enforcement, harming
the public and giving a gift to industry, hopefully under the radar screen.
Texas’ emergency waiver after Hurricane Harvey, and the various COVID
environmental enforcement waivers seem to fit this type. And even if this
is not the intent, many are overbroad due to uncertainty, and they continue
too long.

56.
57.
58.

Id. at 905.
Brugger, supra note 5.
Rand Strauss, Sandy’s Environmental Impact: What Are Your Officials Doing?,
H UFFPOST (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sandys-environmentalimpact_b_2215254 [https://perma.cc/MR7H-FUT8].
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IV. WHY ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION IS NOT AS DANGEROUS AS
SYSTEM-WIDE EMERGENCY WAIVERS
While we have so far focused on the constraints on the state and federal
governments regarding when emergencies can be declared, what can be
waived, and for how long, it should also be noted that state and federal
agencies have the general option of failing to take enforcement actions
under the broad category of enforcement or prosecutorial discretion.
The principle of prosecutorial discretion grants prosecutors and regulators
enormous power over whom they pursue charges or complaints against.59
In the federal environmental law context, however, some non-enforcement
discretion may be practically and legally limited. With respect to permits
and permit provisions, the major environmental law citizen suits allow
“citizen enforcers” when neither the state nor the federal government
takes action. The Clean Air Act provision states that
. . . . [A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against
any person . . . who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged
violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of (A) an emission standard
or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation. . . .60

This citizen suit provision has been limited by case law doctrine.61 As
stated in an earlier article:
In 1987, Congress shielded state enforcement of NPDES violations from citizens’
suits if the alleged permit breaches were being ‘diligently prosecuted.’ Most
courts have interpreted this ‘diligent prosecution’ bar broadly to preclude any
citizen’s suit based upon the same CWA violations alleged in an administrative
action, not allowing such challenges ‘merely because [the citizens] do not agree
with the type or extent of punishment imposed.’ This problem is exacerbated
when many consent orders are not made public or could appear to be “sweetheart”
deals. Thus, judicial relief in a citizen’s suit challenge to an NPDES permit
enforcement is an ‘odd duck’ indeed, and generally occurs only when the state
specifically does not impose any penalty for the NPDES permit violation. This

59. Prosecutorial Discretion Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.
uslegal.com/p/prosecutorial-discretion/ [https://perma.cc/435H- 52WM].
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
61. Steven Russo, States, Citizens, and the Clean Water Act: State Administrative
Enforcement and the Diligent Prosecution Defense, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 231 (1995).
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allows the states to lower standards strategically by taking minimal actions to
prevent citizens’ suits.62

But as much of a bar as this can be to citizen’s suits, it has not been applied
when the agency takes no action.63 The permit shield is no bar to citizen
suit actions if the state enforcement action does not specifically alter the
terms of the permit itself.64 So in the situation we saw with the EPA and
COVID environmental enforcement waivers, citizen suits might not
be prevented with individual waivers outside of an agency specific action
or statement to the contrary.
There is some relevant case law in terms of such agency non-enforcement
pronouncements. In the Utility Air Regulatory Group v. the EPA, the Supreme
Court struck down the EPA’s “tailoring rule” for new greenhouse gas
sources as not justified by an “exercise of EPA’s enforcement discretion.”65
The court stated:
Agencies exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence or
ambiguity; they must always “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”66

In so doing, the court explicitly noted the Administration’s admission
that merely “not enforcing” would still leave permitted sources vulnerable
to citizen’s suits under the Clean Air Act.67 According to the court:
EPA itself has recently affirmed that the “independent enforcement authority”
furnished by the citizen-suit provision cannot be displaced by a permitting
authority’s decision not to pursue enforcement.68

Therefore, such enforcement decisions must be more than lack of
enforcement, they must be at least an attempt by an agency to alter or interpret
legal norms through agency action under the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA), sections 553 and 557.69 Actions subject to the APA’s provisions
must not be arbitrary or capricious, nor an abuse of discretion, and must
also be in conformance with law.70

62. Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It: The Failure of Enforcement in
the Clean Water Act, 25 B. COLL. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 20 (1997) (citations omitted).
63. Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1119–20 (9th Cir.
1996).
64. Id. at 1115–17.
65. Util. Air Reg. Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014).
66. Id. at 326 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551
U.S. 664 (2007)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 327.
69. Administrative Procedure Act § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (2012).
70. Administrative Procedures Act § 706.
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General exercise of categorical enforcement discretion has been ruled
permissible for agency action. But a recent Supreme Court Case concerning
DACA illustrates potential limits placed on agencies’ use of policy wide
enforcement discretion.71 In this case, the Department of Homeland Security
attempted to rescind DACA in response to the Attorney General’s determination
that certain benefits of the DACA program were illegal, and the DHS was
legally bound by the determination.72 However, the Court reasoned that,
because the eligibility and protection from deportation (forbearance) benefit
components of DACA were distinguishable, the DHS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by not providing reasonable justification for why it did not
retain the forbearance component.73 The Court further explained that,
although the DHS’s Acting Secretary clearly recognized her discretionary
authority in “winding down the program,” she did not appear to understand
the scope of her discretion.74 Because DHS and its acting Secretary failed
to provide an explanation of the scope of its enforcement discretion, and
failed to exercise that discretion reasonably, recission of DACA was
unreasonable. This suggests that when an agency is utilizing its enforcement
discretion, it must be careful to provide well-articulated reasons, particularly
if the non-enforcement decision infringes on legitimate legislative objectives.
However, with COVID and emergency waivers for environmental laws
generally, there would always be the citizen suit provision which would
make that inapplicable.
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
The specific laws, and the general enforcement discretion, are too broad
in application and too ill planned before their use. A solution would be to
curtail discretion and to require better planning ahead of time. There must
be limits to emergency suspensions of environmental, health, and safety
rules. Regulated parties should have as much incentive as possible to prepare
for and control emission releases during disasters, and data concerning
releases should continue to be gathered to the extent possible. Careful planning
is paramount as disasters are likely to continue increasing in the face of
climate change.
71.
(2020).
72.
73.
74.

Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the U. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891
Id. at 1910.
Id. at 1899.
Id. at 1910–11.

15

There are several possible solutions at the federal level and state level.
A. Pre-planning Before Disaster
To avoid extensive environmental non-compliance and harm, even with
well-intentioned disaster waivers, disaster and pre-disaster preparation is
critical. The EPA could require facilities permitted under the Clean Air
Act, Clean Water Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to
plan for how they can best control emissions or avoid upset emissions when
a disaster or emergency occurs. This could be accomplished with new
rulemaking or guidance.
The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA)
provides a template for this requirement. The EPCRA requires the EPA
administrator to compile a list of hazardous substances and their amounts,
which when present at a facility, trigger the requirement to plan for
an emergency. As a condition of their permits, all permitted CAA, CWA,
and/or RCRA sources could be required to also plan for an emergency or
disaster, or this requirement could be limited to a subset of major sources
above a certain threshold amount of emissions.
The Clean Air Act was amended in 1990 to require “an accidental release
prevention” program, to prevent chemical disasters with air toxics.75 This
could be expanded to all permitted air sources above a certain thresh-hold
criterion. Limiting or starting with the subset of largest sources also would
make the review of such plans more manageable by the implementing
agency. Each source subject to the emergency and disaster planning could
be charged an amount to cover the additional personnel necessary to timely
review such plans. The EPA could start implementing basic regulations to
determine minimum requirements for such plans.
B. Limitation of Emergency Waivers During Disaster
To avoid abuse of emergency waivers, the ability to use such waivers
should be limited. Though states already appear to limit such waivers to
the situations in which waivers are necessary to cope and recover from
disasters, this power has been abused in multiple situations with impunity.
States that have unified government lose whatever checks “legislative approval”
or acquiescence might confer, leaving no route for citizens to check the
emergency power abuse. After Hurricane Harvey, multiple organizations
requested that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality withdraw
its waiver, but enforcing such requests requires extensive administrative
action. A complainant would have to initiate a formal rulemaking or
75.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r) (West 2020).
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enforcement request and then challenge a refusal to initiate such action as
a violation of a state Administrative Procedure Act.
But even legal challenges pursuant to the APA is limited by case law
concerning emergencies and emergency declarations themselves. Despite
courts’ reticence to second guess the executive branch’s emergency declarations,
and increased political polarization during the COVID pandemic, some
such cases have been successful.
A more uniform answer would be to have federal limitations over
emergency suspensions of federal laws administered through cooperative
federalism. Although the actual emergency declarations seem to be an
area in which federal interference would be problematic, some changes
could occur through federal action. For instance, federal rules could help
maintain record keeping which would help prevent unknown or untraceable
environmental harms which occur during enforcement waivers. While
record keeping requirements for federal environmental laws might still be
suspended during a disaster, the EPA could promulgate a rule under its
CAA, CWA, and RCRA power that specifies that to the extent possible, all
permitted entities should keep records of releases during disaster suspensions
and continue to report these to their permitting agency (whether the state
or the federal government). Except during the most intense phase of an
emergency, when personnel may need to evacuate, or power is not available,
most companies are already keeping track of their releases. There is no
reason they should not be required to report what they know.
For these same statutes, the EPA could clarify that a state’s emergency
suspension of environmental rules for federally based requirements (such
as RCRA, CERCLA, the CWA, and CAA) will be subject to federal agency
review. And such waivers should automatically sunset after a certain period
of time, subject to the state demonstrating the continued inability of permitted
parties to meet their obligations. Failure to do so could work as a revocation
of the state’s authority to continue administering that particular act.
It is true that the EPA has little appetite or capacity for state program
takeovers,76 but with an adequately funded EPA it would be possible.
Additionally, the mere threat of a possible takeover can alter state actions.77
As noted in the introduction, the TCEQ’s request for emergency waivers
76. Flatt, supra note 62, at 31.
77. See e.g., Matthew Tresaugue, Texas Seeks to Regain Control of Greenhouse
Gas Permits, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
houston-texas/houston/article/Texas-seeks-to-regain-control-of-greenhouse-gas-4446604.php
[https://perma.cc/8LRH-SVFM].
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was purportedly based on active hurricane impacts or loss of power, but
continued for over 8 months after the initial danger. A one-month (or even
two week) sunset would have been effective as the emergency conditions
would have passed any re-passage of such waivers would have appeared
arbitrary and capricious.
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